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A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE EEOC's POLICY
AGAINST MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Beth M. Primmt
The popularity of arbitration as an alternative to formal adjudication
of employment disputes has grown exponentially in recent years,
particularly because "[elmployment litigation has grown at a rate many
times greater than litigation in general .... almost one thousand percent
greater than the increase in all other types of civil litigation combined."'
Employers are usually attracted by the costs of arbitration, which are
typically much less than those of litigation. Employee-claimants may
prefer arbitration for the sake of privacy, both within their current
employment and with respect to their reputation throughout the workforce
at large. However, on July 10, 1997, the Equal Opportunity Employment
Commission ("EEOC") issued a policy statement against the use of
mandatory binding arbitration of employment discrimination disputes as a
condition of employment. The Commission fears that employees will be
offered contracts with pre-dispute arbitration clauses on a mandatory "take
it or leave it" basis. Effectively, such employees would be forced to choose
between their jobs and their right to a judicial forum for employment
claims. According to the EEOC, such agreements are, quite simply,
contrary to the fundamental principles of modern employment law.
The EEOC's decision to address the intense and long-standing debate
over the utility of mandatory arbitration in individual employment contracts
is not surprising. As early as 1983, the Supreme Court declared, and has
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continued to declare, that employment contracts fall within the scope of the
Federal Arbitration Act.2 This statute does not exempt claims based upon
federal statutes, nor is the issue espoused in the drafters' intent. However,
a split in the circuits, the EEOC, and the legal and mainstream press have
kept the debate alive. Critics continuously resurrect their distrust of
arbitration as a vehicle for attacking mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts. In contrast, supporters of the plan often focus on
how such agreements can be used effectively and without bias or abuse.
This Comment will examine the reasoning set forth by the EEOC in
support of its broad policy against all mandatory arbitration agreements.
Although many of the Commission's arguments are compelling and were
perhaps justified at one time in our judicial and arbitration history, the
arguments are no longer sufficient to warrant a general ban against all
mandatory agreements. Part I of this Comment will summarize the history
of the current dispute over the arbitration of individual employment
disputes, particularly with respect to statutorily created rights. Part II will
outline the EEOC's policy statement and briefly summarize the level of
deference historically afforded to the EEOC and its policy statements. Part
m will demonstrate why the EEOC's position against mandatory
agreements is overzealous and thinly justified in this era, when relatively
few companies are using such agreements, when the courts have
consistently rejected many of the arguments set forth by the Commission,
and when the obvious benefits of arbitration, mandatory or not, outweigh
any potential sources of bias or abuse. Finally, Part IV will conclude with
some suggestions for employers and the EEOC to ensure fair mandatory
arbitration agreements.
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-206 (1994). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 445 (1998), in
which the Ninth Circuit held that a female securities broker did not have to arbitrate her sex
discrimination claims under Title VII pursuant to~her U-4 agreement. However, the justices
denied certiorari without comment, and, therefore, this decision does not qualify as a
"declaration" from the Supreme Court. Moreover, in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391, 397 (1998), a unanimous Court held that an employee covered by a
collective bargaining agreement requiring mandatory arbitration of employment disputes
could bypass the contractual process and pursue his Americans with Disabilities claim in
court because the union-negotiated waiver of judicial forum was not "clear and
unmistakable." However, the Court explicitly declined to consider the applicability of the
FAA in this context. See id. at 395 n.1.
3. See, e.g., Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnstone, A Management
Perspective: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment
Litigation, 52 Disp. RESOL. J. 19 (1997).
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I. THE PATH TO THE PRESENT DEBATE
A. What Are Mandatory Arbitration Agreements?
Typically, employers use two types of arbitration agreements in the
nonunion context. The first type is the post-dispute agreement, in which
both employer and employee contractually agree to arbitration after a
dispute has arisen. These agreements do not raise particularly challenging
issues because the law has been relatively clear on such knowing and
voluntary waivers.4 The second type is the pre-dispute or "mandatory"
agreement. These agreements are programs which "require, as a term and
condition of employment, that all disputes arising from employment or the
termination of employment, including statutory employment discrimination
claims, be resolved through mandatory, binding arbitration." 5 Mandatory
agreements can be inserted into contracts, often as stand-alone agreements,
or even incorporated by reference. Regardless of the form, these
agreements must be signed as a condition of employment.
6
B. The Enforceability ofAgreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims
The current debate regarding the use of mandatory arbitration in the
employment context can be traced to the 1925 enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA").7  The explicit purpose of the FAA was to
manifest a federal policy in favor of arbitration. Pursuant to section 2 of
the FAA, written arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract."' Thus, the FAA made agreements to arbitrate
both future and existing disputes equally as enforceable as all other
contracts.9
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Robert J. Lewton, Comment, Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements a
Viable Solution for Employers Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment
Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB. L. REV. 991, 993 (1996).
6. See Robert Belton, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1568, 1671 (1996).
7. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-206 (1994).
8. Id. § 2 (1994).
9. See David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 89
(1997) (discussing the essence of the exception). Note, however, that section 1 of the FAA
contains an exception to the general acceptance of agreements to arbitrate: "nothing herein
contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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Despite the clear endorsement of arbitration by the legislature, the
judiciary was very unreceptive to the new national policy favoring
arbitration. In fact, for nearly thirty years after the enactment of the FAA,
the courts consistently applied a broad "public policy exception" to the
statutory rule of presumptively enforcing arbitration agreements.' ° First, in
Wilko v. Swan," the Court denied enforcement of an arbitration clause in a
brokerage contract where the customer claimed damages for
misrepresentation under the Securities Act of 1933. The Court based its
decision on the terms of the Act, which explicitly banned any stipulation to
waive compliance with the substance of the statute. Specifically, the Court
reasoned that the Securities Act "was drafted with an eye to the
disadvantages under which buyers labor."' 2 The Court effectively held that
the Act explicitly gives a securities fraud plaintiff special rights to choose
the venue and forum that could not be surrendered contractually.
The reasoning applied in Wilko gained prompt and widespread
acceptance by the lower courts. For example, in American Safety
Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 13 the Second Circuit concluded
that claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act could not be compelled into
arbitration by a contractual arbitration clause. The court expanded the
"public policy exception" set forth in Wilko and reasoned that antitrust
claims, clearly issues of considerable public import, were best determined
in a public forum.' 4 Ultimately, all lower courts accepted the American
Safety pronouncement that Sherman Antitrust Act claims could not be
compelled into arbitration. 15 The reasoning underlying this line of cases
was subsequently applied to reject compelled arbitration under a number of
other federal statutes.
16
Despite this limitation, most courts construe this clause very narrowly and apply it only to
contracts covering those in the transportation industry. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v.
Brewery Workers Local No. 9, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1160 (1985); Ewing v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir.
1972); Dickstein v. DuPont, 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v.
United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., Local 437, 207 F.2d 450, 452 (3d Cir. 1953).
10. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 89.
11. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
12.Id. at 435.
13. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
14. See id. at 827.
15. See, e.g., NPS Communications v. Continental Group, Inc., 760 F.2d 463, 466 (2d
Cir. 1985); Lake Communications v. ICC Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1477-80 (9th Cir. 1984);
University Life Ins. Co. v. Unimarc Ltd., 699 F.2d 846, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1983); Lee v.
Ply*Gem Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1274-75 (D.C. Cir. 1979); N.V. Maatschappij Voor
Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam);
Helfenbein v. Int'l Indus., 438 F.2d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 1971).
16. See, e.g., McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986),
rev'd, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (rejecting compelled arbitration of a RICO claim); Lewis v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
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Twenty-one years after Wilko, a separate line of civil rights cases
emerged to rein in the national policy favoring arbitration. In 1974, the
Supreme Court reviewed a lower court's ruling that an arbitrator's binding
decision regarding an unlawful, discriminatory discharge pursuant to a
collective bargaining grievance procedure barred a plaintiff-employee's
Title VII claim.17 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision,
allowing the petitioner, an African-American member of the Steelworkers'
Union, to pursue his claim of racial discrimination in the courts despite the
collective bargaining agreement's mandatory grievance procedure.
According to the Court, despite the federal policy favoring arbitration,
"Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly suggest that an individual
does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first pursues his grievance
to final arbitration."1 8 Even more broadly, the Court stated that "there can
be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VI."'9
Ultimately, the Court extended the principle in Alexander to other
federal civil rights claims. In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System,
Inc.,2° the Court held that an employee's wage claim under the Fair Labor
Standards Act was not barred by a prior binding grievance arbitration on
the same issue.21 In McDonald v. City of West Branch,22 the Court held that
a labor arbitrator's decision did not restrict an employee from litigating a
wrongful discharge claim. Courts also extended the Alexander reasoning to
private contractual arbitration in addition to union-negotiated collective
bargaining agreements.23 Thus, at least for a period of time, pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, whether by collective bargaining agreements or
private contracts, could not be enforced to preclude litigation of statutory
civil rights claims.
C. The Downfall of the "Public Policy Exception"
The combination of the reasoning applied in Wilko, American Safety,
and especially Alexander could have provided a strong front against
enforcement of any pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate statutory claims.
(rejecting compelled arbitration of an ERISA claim).
17. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
18. Id. at49.
19. Id. at51.
20. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
21. See id. at 740 (citing a previous Supreme Court holding that "FLSA rights cannot
be abridged by contract or otherwise waived because this would 'nullify the purposes' of the
statute.") (citation omitted).
22. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
23. See, e.g., Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989); Swenson v.
Management Recruiters Int'l, 858 F.2d 1304, 1309 (8th Cir. 1988); Bierdeman v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 211, 213-14 (N.D. Cal. 1990), rev'd, 963 F.2d 378 (9th
Cir. 1992).
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However, courts chose not to create a blanket policy against arbitration of
these claims; rather, they determined each case on a statute-by-statute
basis. At the same time, the general arguments against arbitration in Wilko,
American Safety, Alexander, and their progeny were highly susceptible to
attack because of their primary emphasis on concerns about arbitral
competence and neutrality.24 Soon after Wilko, the legal profession became
increasingly comfortable with arbitration. Trained lawyers and judges
appeared on arbitration rosters instead of, or at least in addition to, retired
industry leaders and current executives. Additionally, private arbitration
entities overcame the fear of bias created by industry-specific bodies.
25
Thus, as the attack on the arbitration system itself was rebuffed by the
profession at large, the justifications for denying enforcement of arbitration
agreements became increasingly tenuous.
In fact, the "public policy exception" created in Alexander was first
attacked the same year in which the case was decided. In Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co.,26 the Court declined to apply Wilko to a claim under
federal securities law for alleged fraud in connection with the sale of
businesses by the Swiss national defendant. According to the Court, strict
enforcement of a contractual arbitration clause in the purchase agreement
was beneficial and necessary in international transactions. 27 However,
because its international component made this case distinguishable, lower
courts confidently continued to apply Wilko to domestic contracts. Still,
the seed for invalidating the "public policy exception" to the FAA had been
planted by Scherk, where the Court observed in dicta that "a colorable
argument could be made 2 that Wilko, which involved a claim under the
Securities Act of 1933, would not apply to a claim under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
The dicta of Scherk eventually materialized eleven years later in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.29 Although this
24. For example, the Court in Alexander placed primary emphasis on the shortcomings
of arbitration with respect to the implementation and enforcement of statutory policies.
These shortcomings included: (1) the absence of a complete record; (2) the inapplicability of
normal rules of evidence; (3) the lack of a requirement to set forth reasons for the decision;
(4) the arbitrator's focus on party intent, not legislative requirements; and (5) inferior
procedures. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974).
25. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 95 (describing the two flaws in the analyses used by
post-Wilko courts with respect to arbitration of statutory claims as the improved arbitration
system and the mistaken focus on the character of the statutory right at issue rather than the
effects of the waiver of the right to judicial access).
26. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
27. See id. at 516 (explaining that enforcement of arbitration clauses is "an almost
indispensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to
any international business transaction").
28. Id. at513.
29. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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case arose out of an international transaction, the Court applied a broader
federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution regardless of the site of
the underlying transaction. 30 The Supreme Court found no reason to create
or continue the presumption against arbitrability of statutory claims. In
fact, the Court created a presumption that compelled arbitration of statutory
claims has no impact on statutory rights:
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forego
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial forum. It
trades the procedures and opportunity for review of the
courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of
arbitration.31
Moreover, in Mitsubishi Motors, the Court expanded its attack on the
Wilko, American Safety, and Alexander doctrines. Specifically, with
respect to American Safety, the Court expressed a strong disdain for the
presumption that a broad arbitration agreement could be negated due to
adhesion or unconscionability without specific evidence of such offenses.32
Additionally, the Court addressed the Alexander Court's fear of the
complexity of arbitration and the bias of arbitrators. The Mitsubishi
Motors Court concluded that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement indicates
that the parties to a contract opted for simpler procedures and that the
courts are required to defer to those wishes.33  Similarly, because the
arbitrators are typically "drawn from the legal as well as the business
community," the fears of incompetence or bias were no longer sufficient to
support a presumption against arbitration.34
Several major arbitration decisions following Mitsubishi Motors
solidified the Supreme Court's policy favoring the enforcement of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements by focusing on general questions of
enforcement independent of any international aspect. First, in
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,35 two customers sued their
broker under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Practices Act ("RICO") for alleged excessive trading
and fraudulent investment advice. However, the customer agreements
included an industry-standard arbitration clause covering any controversy
arising out of or related to the accounts. The Supreme Court, again
invoking the "federal policy favoring arbitration," enforced the arbitration
30. See id. at 632.
31. Id. at 628.
32. See id. at 632-33.
33. See id. at 633.
34. Id. at 634.
35. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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clause.36 The Court acknowledged that the presumption of enforceability
laid down in Mitsubishi Motors could be overruled by contrary
congressional intent, but noted that the party opposing arbitration carried
the burden of showing this legislative limitation or prohibition.37 As
construed by the Court in McMahon, Mitsubishi Motors suggested that
most statutory rights would be found arbitrable, or at the least, that factors
such as the complexity of the underlying statute, public interest, or even the
importance of the statutory claim would not, even in the aggregate, be
sufficient to overcome the policy in favor of arbitration. 8
In Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,39 the
Court took the opportunity to invalidate the last hope of the "public policy
exception" to the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration agreements that
had been established in Wilko, American Safety, and Alexander. In this
case, the Court addressed the enforceability of arbitration agreements
covering claims arising from the Securities Act of 193340 and provided its
clearest statement yet on the nature of the right to proceed in a judicial
forum. According to the Court, the right to a judicial forum is a
"procedural" right that can be altered or amended by an arbitration
agreement, much like a forum selection clause.41
D. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. and Its Progeny: The Current
State of the Law
After McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, it seemed unlikely that a
pre-dispute arbitration agreement would be deemed unenforceable, even
with respect to a statutory claim. Indeed, when the issue of whether age
discrimination claims could be subject to compulsory arbitration pursuant
to a mandatory arbitration agreement arose, the Court answered in the
affirmative in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.42
The plaintiff in Gilmer was required to register with a stock exchange
as a condition of his employment with a large brokerage house. He
complied, agreeing in the contract with the stock exchange "to arbitrate any
36. Id. at 226 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Credit Corp., 460 U.S.
1, 24-25 (1983)).
37. See id. at 227.
38. See id. at 239.
39. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
40. Wilko was decided under the Securities Act of 1933, while McMahon was decided
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Therefore, where Congress intended the two
securities acts to be read together, the Court acknowledged the inconsistency of Wilko and
McMahon. Thus, Rodriguez de Quijas was simply the "second step" in overruling Wilko.
See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 101.
41. See Rodriguez de QuUas, 490 U.S. at 482.
42. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
1999] MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 159
dispute, claim or controversy" arising out of his employment.43 When his
employer discharged him at age sixty-two, he filed a claim with the EEOC
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")44 instead of
submitting the issue to arbitration. Interstate/Johnson Lane moved to
compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion, but the Fourth
Circuit reversed.45
The Supreme Court followed McMahon, placing on the
plaintiff-employee the burden of proving congressional intent to negate
mandatory arbitration clauses with respect to statutorily created
employment rights. Because neither the text of the ADEA nor its legislative
history explicitly precluded mandatory arbitration, the Court enforced the
arbitration clause.46 The Court rejected both the "important social issue"
argument and the challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures once
accepted in Wilko and Alexander.47 As the final departure from precedent,
the Court limited Alexander to the labor law setting, rendering it
inapplicable to private contracts subject to the FAA.48
However, because Gilmer did not involve an employment contract,
opponents to mandatory arbitration agreements, including some circuit
courts, argued that the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
employment contracts remained an open question. Employment law
scholars and practitioners, in addition to businesses and their employees,
optimistically anticipated a finer articulation of the Court's posture towards
mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts in the
November 1998 decision in Wright. In fact, the Court acknowledged the
peculiar tension between Alexander and Gilmer.49  Nonetheless, it
explicitly avoided any resolution of the issue of the validity of waiver of a
federal forum for statutory employment claims because "on the facts ... no
such waiver occurred." 50  The Court so held not only because the
agreement's purported waiver was not "clear and unmistakable,"'" but also
in part because the union, rather than the individual, attempted to waive the
right to judicial forum. Thus, the Court's pronouncements in Gilmer
evidencing some favor of mandatory arbitration agreements remain; so too
43. Id. at 23.
44. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
45. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
46. The requirement that contrary congressional intent must be explicit, either in the
statute's text or legislative history, was an increased burden, even from Mitsubishi Motors,
which only required that congressional intent be "deducible" from the legislative history.
See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985). The Gilmer Court acknowledged this
increased burden. See 500 U.S. at 29.
47. See id. at 27, 30.
48. See id. at 35.
49. See Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 119 S. Ct. 391,394 (1998).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at396.
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does the debate.
II. THE EEOC's POLICY AGAINST MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE
ARBrTRATION AGREEMENTS
In accordance with its longstanding opposition to the use of
mandatory arbitration in employment disputes, the EEOC issued a detailed
policy statement outlining its position and justifications. This statement, in
addition to reiterating the Commission's opposition, is intended primarily
to serve as internal guidance for EEOC field offices. However, given the
history of the attitudes of both the legislative and judicial branches towards
the Commission, the level of deference to this policy is questionable. Due
to the EEOC's role as an independent executive agency and as the
processor of a majority of the employment discrimination claims, its
positions do not have to simply reiterate the stance of the judiciary.
However, employers look to the EEOC for education about, and guidance
in applying, the employment discrimination laws. Given the EEOC's
position in stark opposition to the judiciary, the rift between the courts and
the EEOC is troublesome for employers and employees alike.
A. The Interplay Between the Judiciary and the EEOC
"The EEOC is the sole arm of the federal government with an
exclusive focus on eradicating job discrimination. 52 The Supreme Court
has acknowledged "that agency interpretations of silent or ambiguous
statutes are controlling on the courts if Congress has delegated
law-interpreting power to th[at] agency, ' 53 whether expressly or
implicitly.54 However, the Supreme Court has not applied the supposition
that Congress delegated this law-interpreting power to the EEOC. Instead,
the Court has suggested a lesser deference to the EEOC with respect to
employment law interpretation in comparison to the deference afforded
other executive or independent agencies.55 This position is not necessarily
an affront to the EEOC; rather, Congress itself failed to give the
Commission real enforcement power at its inception. While the EEOC's
52. Rebecca Hanner White, The EEOC, the Courts, and Employment Discrimination
Policy: Recognizing the Agency's Leading Role in Statutory Interpretation, 1995 UTAH L.
REV. 51, 53 (1995) (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted).
54. See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865-66 (1984).
55. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-51, 258 (1991) (refusing to
defer to the EEOC's construction of Title VII that allowed extraterritorial application of the
law).
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powers have increased,56 it still lacks the cease-and-desist powers afforded
other agencies. The authority to enforce the employment discrimination
laws is thereby channeled to the courts through private litigation.
57
Nonetheless, the Court is not immune to or ignorant of the suggestions
and recommendations of the EEOC. In EEOC v. Commercial Office
Products,5 the Court explicitly examined and deferred to an EEOC
procedural regulation interpreting Title VII.59 However, three years later,
in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,60 the Court stated that the EEOC's
interpretation of Title VII was of limited persuasive value because it was
not issued contemporaneously with the statute and because it reflected a
change in the agency's position.6 Additionally, the contested EEOC
interpretation at issue in Arabian American Oil was not an interpretive
guideline as in Commercial Office Products. Instead, the EEOC's position
in Arabian American Oil was reflected in less formal documents: a policy
statement, a letter from the EEOC's general counsel, a 1985 decision by the
EEOC, and testimony by the EEOC's Chairman.62 Therefore, although the
EEOC is unquestionably fulfilling its duties in presenting its policy against
mandatory arbitration agreements, the level of deference that the courts
must afford the EEOC is quite limited.
Additionally, the EEOC recognizes the deference it must show to the
judiciary. Certainly, the policy against mandatory arbitration agreements
was issued partly in response to the Court's reasoning in Gilmer. The
policy statement is "published as internal guidance for EEOC
personnel... instruct[ing] commission investigators to 'closely scrutinize
each charge involving an arbitration agreement to determine whether the
agreement was secured under coercive circumstances.' ' 63 The statement is
not a refusal to accept Gilmer.64 The Commission simply intended to
express its belief that Gilmer cannot be extended to individual employment
contracts. The Commission's statement of its position and its justifications
56. For example, Title VII was amended to provide the EEOC with the power to sue in
federal court on behalf of the victims of discrimination, and also to bring claims on its own
behalf. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1994).
57. See, e.g., Robert Belton, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination,
109 HARv. L. REv. 1568, 1573-74 (1996).
58. 486 U.S. 107 (1988).
59. See id. at 114-15.
60. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
61. See id. at 257.
62. See id. at 256-57.
63. EEOC Commission Policy Guidance Reaffirms Long-Standing Opposition to
Mandatory Arbitration, 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at AA-1 (July 11, 1997).
64. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, reprinted in 133 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at E-4 (July 11, 1997) ("The Commission is not unmindful of the case law
enforcing specific mandatory arbitration agreements, in particular, the Supreme Court's
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp .... ).
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did not, however, refer to the reasoning in Gilmer, Mitsubishi Motors, or
any other decision permitting mandatory arbitration agreements.
Therefore, until the Supreme Court decides specifically whether Gilmer
applies to employment contracts, the EEOC certainly has the right to stand
opposed to the trend of the courts.
B. A Summary of the EEOC's Policy Against Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements
The EEOC was clearly concerned about the effects of Gilmer and its
progeny with respect to mandatory arbitration agreements in employment
contracts.6 Accordingly, the Commission chose not to establish guidelines
to ensure the fairness of mandatory arbitration and instead asserted its
opposition to any mandatory arbitration of workplace statutory claims.
In general, the EEOC has characterized mandatory arbitration as
"contrary to the fundamental principles" of employment law.66 In addition,
the Commission has offered two other justifications for its policy against
mandatory arbitration agreements. First, according to the statement, the
federal employment laws were established by the federal government with
the clear intention that the federal government would be responsible for
enforcing and interpreting these laws.67  If private employers were
permitted to use mandatory arbitration agreements, the Commission argues
that the lack of public accountability-whether by the arbitrators or the
parties-and the lack of establishing precedent and doctrine would
completely undermine the goals of federal employment law. 6' According
to the EEOC, "there might be no discrimination claims today based on...
the adverse impact of neutral practices ... or sexual harassment" without
the role of the federal judiciary in employment disputes. 69 Second, the
EEOC views the arbitration process as fraught with structural biases
against employees when arbitration agreements are imposed as a condition
of employment.70 As a repeat customer with a deep pocket, an employer
has an advantage in the arbitrator selection process, or at the very least, is
more knowledgeable of the intricacies of the system than an individual
65. The EEOC is one of the opponents to mandatory arbitration agreements that
believes Gilmer is not dispositive of whether mandatory arbitration agreements in
employment contracts are enforceable because the agreement at issue in Gilmer was a
registration agreement, not an employment contract. See EEOC Policy Statement on
Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See id.
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claimant.7' Based on these two primary justifications, the EEOC strongly
opposes mandatory arbitration agreements and has directed its investigators
to scrutinize closely all charges involving such agreements.
Im. REFUTING THE ARGUMENTS OF = EEOC
While the justifications offered by the EEOC against the enforcement
of mandatory arbitration agreements appear facially compelling, further
inquiry shows that they are overzealous, unsubstantiated, or at the least,
questionable. The EEOC obviously has a right, and in fact, an executive
duty to promulgate rules, guidelines, and policies with respect to the state
of employment law. However, when the Commission forwards a policy as
generic and as sweeping as one that presumptively opposes any and all
mandatory arbitration agreements, it should support its declaration with
compelling arguments. In the case of mandatory arbitration agreements,
the EEOC's justifications are not sufficiently persuasive.
A. The Enforcement of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Is Not
Contrary to Fundamental Principles of Employment Law
According to the EEOC, "[t]he private right of access to the judicial
forum to adjudicate claims is an essential part of the statutory enforcement
scheme., 72 The EEOC then uses this "essential part" to construct a policy
against mandatory arbitration agreements without discussing an
individual's access to the judicial forum. The EEOC's policy instead
focuses on the notion that an individual claimant should serve as "the
chosen instrument of Congress to vindicate" the policies underlying
employment discrimination law in addition to serving her own interests.73
In effect, the EEOC views an employee both as an extension of itself and as
a "private attorney[] general." 74 However, the Commission's view that
individual claimants must have immediate access to the courts in order to
fully benefit from employment discrimination laws fails for two reasons:
(1) the goals of the individual claimant in pursuing statutory claims, and (2)
the lack of any waiver of substantive rights.
First and foremost, mandatory arbitration agreements, if obtained
through informed consent and reasonable methods, can actually achieve the
goals that most individual claimants would cite as fundamental to
employment law-restoring, retaining, and revitalizing employee power
and dignity in the workplace-better than court adjudication. While user
71. See id.
72. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64.
73. ld.
74. Id.
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reaction to arbitration has not been thoroughly researched, some evidence
suggests that parties, both employer-defendants and plaintiff-employees,
are at least as satisfied with arbitration as they are with judicial
adjudication.75 Some employee-participants even perceive arbitration to be
more understandable and satisfactory than the courts.76 Therefore, while
the EEOC may view judicial review of employee claims as fundamental to
employment law, the Commission may be neglecting the concerns and
opinions of the people it was created to protect and represent.
In fact, an in-depth survey of worker attitudes found that fifty-five
percent of employees who had gone to court over workplace rights would
prefer an alternative to the court system.7 7 In response to the alternatives
offered, ninety-five percent of respondents said they would choose an
arbitration system involving both employers and employees.7 s
Understandably, many workers fear the "mandatory" label of pre-dispute
agreements and believe it should be illegal to make arbitration agreements
a condition of employment.79 However, as long as the elements necessary
for contract formation are present, and assuming an absence of fraud and
unconscionability, employees should be competent to make personal
decisions regarding the nature of their workplace, including the manner in
which disputes are resolved .8
Apparently, however, the EEOC and other pre-dispute agreement
opponents view the unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees as a strong justification for their position. Some commentators
suggest that mandatory agreements should not be permitted in employment
contracts because the courts are necessary to shift "the balance of power
more equitably in favor of those who ha[ve] long possessed far less
bargaining power.""s  However, this reasoning neglects the fact that
75. See Jessica Pearson, An Evaluation of Alternatives to Court Adjudication, in
CONSUMER DIsPuTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES 313, 344 (Larry Ray &
Deborah Smolover eds., 1983) (stating that "evidence suggests litigants and attorneys
experiencing arbitration are at least as satisfied as those experiencing adjudication").
76. See id. at 351.
77. See Joseph G. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 50 (1996) (citing a study by
Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers).
78. See id.
79. See id. (citing 75% as the minimum survey response).
80. See Jeffrey Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377,
1413-14 (1991) (stating that there appears to be no judicially recognized adhesion defense;
rather, courts only invoke the doctrine of adhesion in arbitration agreements to support a
finding of unconscionability or public policy).
81. Maria C. Whittaker, Gilmer v. Interstate: Liberal Policy Favoring Arbitration
Trammels Policy Against Employment Discrimination, 56 ALB. L. REv. 273, 276 (1992);
see also John A. Gray, Have the Foxes Become the Guardians of the Chickens? The
Post-Gilmer Legal Status of Pre-dispute Mandatory Arbitration as a Condition of
Employment, 37 VL. L. REv. 113 (1992) (discounting benefits of arbitration because of the
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inequality of bargaining power alone does not necessarily make a contract
unconscionable. The doctrine of unconscionability seeks to prevent
12substantial unfairness or deplorable contracting practices. Employment
contracts with clear notice of mandatory arbitration clauses certainly do not
satisfy this criteria because an employee is given the choice to accept or not
accept based on the conditions of arbitration and the fact that the system,
although mandatory, does not leave the employee without recourse. 3 In
fact, at least one commentator compares the use of mandatory arbitration
agreements to an employer's decision to provide health insurance, which is
also of great importance to employees. 4 A similar analogy may be drawn
to workers' compensation laws. Before workers' compensation statutes,
workers with serious injuries were able to command substantial recoveries
before a jury. However, with the workers' compensation system,
workplace safety is promoted while injured workers are adequately
compensated8 5  Finally, calling a mandatory arbitration agreement a
contract of adhesion would be inconsistent with the FAA's explicit "intent
of making arbitration agreements as valid and enforceable as any
contract.
8 6
Additionally, most employees simply want the discriminatory
practices or harassment to stop.87 Individuals litigate only after years of
being denied relief. Arbitration, even if it is mandatory, provides
employees with a chance to achieve the relief they desire without having to
spend $50,000 to $80,00088 and four to five years89 litigating a "simple"
discrimination claim.90 Through arbitration, an investigation and resolution
inequality of bargaining power).
82. See Anne Brafford, Note, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion:
Fair Play or Trapfor the Weak and Unwary?, 21 J. CoRp. L. 331, 349-50 (1996).
83. See id.
84. See Stempel, supra note 80, at 1314.
85. See Samuel Estreicher, Pre-dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344, 1351 (1997).
86. R. James Fillault, Comment, Enforcing Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts: A Common Sense Approach to the Federal Arbitration Act's
Section I Exclusion, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 559, 581 (1996) (footnote omitted).
87. See Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer. Compulsory
Arbitration of Statutory Anti-discrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 347,
348 (footnotes omitted) (explaining why ADR in general is attractive to both employers and
employees).
88. See id.
89. See Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employment
Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age and ADA
Claims, 37 ST. Louis U. L.J. 985, 991 (1993) (describing the typical situation which occurs
when adjudicating employment claims).
90. See Richard A. Bales, A New Direction for American Labor Law: Individual
Autonomy and the Compulsory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights, 30 Hous. L.
REv. 1863, 1906 (1994) (citing the high costs of discrimination claims).
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can be completed within six to nine months from the time of the incident9'
in a much less adversarial environment. Additionally, and perhaps most
importantly, while the "successful" claimant may recognize a greater
monetary gain through litigation than arbitration,92 an individual subject to
a mandatory arbitration agreement can retain her current job without being
branded a "troublemaker" by her current or future employer, thereby
reducing the risk of conflict with coworkers after a jury award becomes
public.93
Finally, the arbitration system, whether mandatory or not, should be
lauded, not rejected, by the EEOC for its ability to protect less
sophisticated workers better than the court system. Because of their low
salaries, low-income employees often do not have access to the judicial
process. Further, low salaries make large damage awards highly unlikely
and therefore make it quite difficult for low-income plaintiffs to attract
resourceful, competent attorneys. 4
Thus, despite the EEOC's argument that arbitration cannot protect or
achieve the fundamental goals of employment law, evidence exists that
arbitration, whether mandatory or not, can serve the needs of claimants,
particularly low-income employees, better than the current system of
adjudication. Until the monetary and time expenditures necessary to
pursue a claim in the court system decline significantly, the EEOC's
position of prohibiting any and all mandatory arbitration agreements stands
counter to the needs of employees. Under the EEOC's policy, an
91. See Garry G. Mathiason, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration
Policies and Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-First Century, Q227
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 23,41 (1994).
92. Opponents of mandatory arbitration often cite the high jury awards received in
employment suits compared to the relatively low awards in arbitration as an indication that
arbitration cannot benefit employees. However, these comparisons can be highly
misleading to a majority of workers, for only the high damage cases are likely to go to trial.
See Cliff Palefsky, Wrongful Termination Litigation: "Dagwood" & Goliath, 62 MICH. BAR
J. 776, 776 (1983) (citing high damage awards from juries). Additionally, the average
employment discrimination claimant loses both his suit and most likely his job. Therefore,
arbitration may offer recourse to an employee who would otherwise have none. See Steve
Holmes, Workers Find It Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
1991, at Al.
93. See E. Patrick McDermott, Survey of 92 Key Companies: Using ADR to Settle
Employment Disputes, 50 J. DisP. RESOL. 8, 8 (1995) (emphasizing that high monetary
awards from litigation may be outweighed by nonmonetary gains via arbitration); see also
Matthews, supra note 87, at 361 (mentioning potential for coworker conflicts).
94. Employment attorneys commonly reject 90% of the cases brought to them,
regardless of the merits of the claim, because the economics of the court system with respect
to employment law mandates that only the most valuable cases be pursued in litigation. In
fact, discrimination claims have become so problematic, many attorneys refuse to represent
plaintiffs who have been discriminated against. See Eric Schnapper, Advocates Deterred by
Fee Issues, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at Cl.
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individual claimant must become a "private attorney[]-general 95 to find
relief, rather than permitting her to resolve the matter in an informal and
less costly manner at the workplace.
A second reason why the EEOC's policy against mandatory
arbitration agreements is unjustifiable on the basis of the "fundamental
principles" of employment law is that the agreements do not constitute
waivers of any substantive rights or protection. The Gilmer Court clearly
expressed that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are merely exchanges of
forum, not a surrender of substantive rights or statutory remedies.96 Thus,
an arbitration agreement cannot direct or permit an arbitrator to apply rules
of liability different from those mandated by the applicable statute.97 For
example, in Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co.,98 the Ninth Circuit
refused to enforce an arbitration agreement because provisions of the
agreement established a shorter statute of limitations than the statute
allowed and precluded exemplary damages and attorneys' fees where both
were authorized by statute.
Additionally, in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Lai,99 the same court
addressed extrinsic factors presented by the plaintiff-claimants opposing
enforcement of the same arbitration agreement involved in Gilmer. In this
case, the court refused to compel arbitration because the plaintiffs were
recent immigrants, had limited language skills when executing the
agreement, were not informed of the arbitration provision, and lacked
business experience. l°° The Seventh Circuit applied similar reasoning in its
decision in Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics.'0l The court held that
an arbitration clause in an employment contract was not enforceable
because of lack of consideration in the form of any reciprocal employer
promise with respect to the arbitration system. Finally, the Michigan
Supreme Court declined to enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement in
an employee handbook because the employer reserved the right to modify
the handbook "at its sole discretion" and could alter the arbitration
agreement without employee knowledge or input.0 3 Thus, although a
mandatory arbitration agreement may be presumptively enforceable,
"waivers of judicial forum that reflect an employer's fraudulent, misleading
95. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64.
96. See 500 U.S. at 31-32.
97. See Grodin, supra note 77, at 27; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32 (indicating the
change in the forum of resolution did not limit the arbitrator's authority to grant equitable
and legal relief in disputes regarding statutory rights).
98. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
99. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 61 (1995).
100. See id. at 1305.
101. 121F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997).
102. See id. at 1130.
103. Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 1996).
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or retaliatory conduct are not valid, and arbitration will not be compelled
under these circumstances."' 1 4
Furthermore, regardless of the availability of mandatory arbitration
agreements, the federal government still retains ultimate control over the
protection and enforcement of the fundamental principles of employment
law. First, section 10(b) of the FAA provides that the partiality or
corruption of arbitrators provides a clear basis for withholding enforcement
of an arbitrator's award. Additionally, the Court in Gilmer assured that the
scope of review applied to arbitration awards, albeit limited, is sufficient to
ensure compliance with the workplace discrimination statutes. 0 5 Finally,
the Gilmer Court emphasized that arbitration cannot substitute for the filing
of a claim with the EEOC and any subsequent investigations or action by
the Commission.10 6 Therefore, as one observer writes, "it would seem that
mandatory arbitration in itself poses no real threat to employees as long as
it is procedurally adequate and even may be advantageous to a claimant
seeking recovery."107
B. The EEOC's Argument That the Interpretation and Enforcement of
Employment Laws Have Traditionally Been Left to the Federal
Government Is Questionable
The EEOC's second justification for opposing mandatory arbitration
agreements is that the federal government, not private employers, is
responsible for the "interpretation, administration, and enforcement"1 8 of
these laws, with the judiciary charged with final authority for interpretation
of ambiguous language. According to the EEOC, private arbitration cannot
usurp the courts' role in adjudicating employment discrimination matters,
104. Lucille M. Ponte, In the Shadow of Gilmer: How Post-Gilmer Legal Challenges to
Pre-dispute Arbitration Agreements Point the Way Towards Greater Fairness in
Employment Arbitration, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 359, 374 (1997); see also EZ Pawn
Corp. v. Gonzalez, 921 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to compel arbitration
pursuant to mandatory agreement because of fraudulent representation of the arbitration
agreement's substantive provisions); EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic Servs., 67
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (rejecting arbitration under mandatory
agreement because the agreement was required in retaliation for filing sexual harassment
charges).
105. See 500 U.S. at 32.
106. See id. at 27; see also EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (5th Cir.
1987) (holding employee waiver of right to file charge with EEOC void as against public
policy).
107. Brian K. Van Engen, Note, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration:
The Expansion of Mandatory Arbitration for Statutory Claims and the Congressional Effort
to Reverse the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391, 414 (1995).
108. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64.
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given its importance to the public and the legislature.' °9 However, in
making such statements, the EEOC curiously ignores the statements and
actions made by both the legislative and judicial branches with respect to
the role of arbitration and reasserts arguments that have been directly
refuted by the courts and the legislature. Additionally, the EEOC's
"protection" of the role of the federal government in employment law is
potentially counterproductive to its own operations. For these reasons, the
EEOC should reevaluate its position that the federal government must be
the sole enforcer and protector of employment law rights.
First, beginning with Mitsubishi Motors, the Supreme Court made
clear its preference for arbitration. "By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute;
it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial
forum."110 Following Mitsubishi Motors, the Court continued to reject
arguments critical of pre-dispute arbitration agreements while the EEOC
supported them. For example, in Rodriguez de Quijas, the Court explicitly
dismissed concerns that the deprivation of judicial access through pre-
dispute agreements is effectuated at a time when the individual is least able
to consider the consequences. Today, the EEOC considers this argument
fundamental to its crusade against pre-dispute agreements."'
Similarly, in Gilmer, the Court systematically refuted each of the
"structural limitation" arguments set forth by the plaintiff, which the EEOC
reasserts in its policy. For example, the plaintiff Gilmer asserted, as the
EEOC contends, that the absence of written opinions would decrease public
awareness of particular discriminatory policies. However, the Supreme
Court retorted to Gilmer that this same concern applies to claims filed in
court,"2 since so many cases result in a settlement rather than a published
decision. The Court in Gilmer also dismissed the "adverse effect on the
development of law" argument offered by the EEOC and Gilmer, by noting
that not every claim will be subject to arbitration.1 3 Certainly, not every
company will have prearranged agreements to arbitrate.'1 Furthermore,
these agreements will not be enforced when they are the result of fraud or
threat of retaliation."' In conclusion, the Court cautioned that the limited
discovery and rules of evidence applied in arbitration proceedings
109. See id.
110. Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.
111. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc, 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989).
112. See500U.S. at 31.
113. See Grodin, supra note 77, at 24 (noting only 8.3% of employers polled are
considering using mandatory arbitration agreements).
114. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
115. See Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich.
1996).
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beneficially increase efficiency and establish a less adversarial environment
for addressing employment law issues. 116 Because the Supreme Court has
not specifically decided the issue, the EEOC may articulate its policy
against mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts, but it
undermines its cause by relying heavily on arguments that have been
refuted by the Court in closely related issues.
Finally, the EEOC's argument that mandatory arbitration agreements
allow private individuals to usurp the role of the federal government in
employment discrimination cases is flawed. In fact, the federal courts are
instituting their own system of arbitration for employment discrimination
claims. Since 1991, federal courts may, without application of either party,
require any discrimination cases involving claims under $100,000 to be
submitted to court-annexed arbitration' 1 7 Given the courts' willinguess to
permit and encourage fair arbitration, the EEOC should not base its policy
against mandatory arbitration on the argument that traditional courtroom
trials are the only entities capable of enforcing and protecting employment
rights.
The legislature has consistently endorsed arbitration, even though its
position on pre-dispute agreements remains ambiguous. The ADA, Title
VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 have explicit provisions encouraging
the resolution of disputes through various alternative methods, including
arbitration."' Additionally, the legislative histories of the employment
laws suggest that the legislature may not be as clearly opposed to pre-
dispute arbitration agreements as the EEOC asserts. For example, although
the House Committee report on the Americans with Disabilities Act
instructed that the Alexander approach be applied to the ADA," 9 this report
was compiled one year before the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer.
Therefore, as even opponents of mandatory arbitration agreements must
admit, the Committee report can be viewed as "merely a statement of what
the Committee 'believed' to then be the existing law as to the effect of an
arbitration clause on a[n] ... employment contract."' 20 Similarly, with
respect to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, because the law became effective
116. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
117. See William M. Howard, The Evolution of Contractually Mandated Arbitration, 48
ARB. . 61, 62 n.4 (1993).
118. For example, section 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 recognizes alternative
dispute resolution as a viable means for the resolution of employment conflicts, including
"settlement negotiations, conciliator, facilitation, mediation, fact finding, mini trials, and
arbitration." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1993). At least one court has relied on this section to
compel arbitration of a Title VII claim pursuant to a pre-dispute agreement. See Patterson v.
Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832 (8th Cir. 1997).
119. See Ponte, supra note 104, at 379 (discussing the failed attempts by Congress to
prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements).
120. Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
554 (1993).
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after Gilmer, it is plausible that Gilmer broadened the understanding of the
limits on arbitration, and, therefore, any legislative history indicating a
contrary intent is of limited significance.12 1  Therefore, "[g]iven the..
broad acceptance of arbitration, and the holding and rationale of Gilmer
and its progeny, it is probable.., that compulsory arbitration agreements
will be enforceable."
122
In fact, ostensibly in recognition of the enforceability of mandatory
arbitration agreements, several members of Congress have introduced bills
seeking to limit their use in employment contracts. None of these bills
advanced beyond committee, perhaps suggesting underlying support for
Gilmer and pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The first version,
introduced in the Senate on April 13, 1994, was known as the Protection
from Coercive Employment Agreements Act.12 The effect of this bill
would have been to amend employment laws to virtually eliminate
mandatory arbitration clauses from employment contracts. The most recent
version of the same bill, introduced in August 1994, as the Civil Rights
Procedures Protection Act of 1994,124 would have amended employment
laws as in the original plan. The bill was reintroduced on February 7, 1995,
and failed again to rally sufficient support.125 Therefore, although the
EEOC has enough allies within Congress who also oppose mandatory
arbitration agreements to keep those proposals on the agenda, the
congressional support has never been sufficient to alter the course set by
Gilmer.
Finally, the EEOC fears the weakening of its own role in enforcing
employment discrimination laws if private employers were permitted to use
mandatory arbitration agreements. They fall to recognize that the use of
these agreements can both increase and strengthen its role in employment
discrimination matters. 126 Instead of focusing its limited resources' 27 on
121. See Donald R. Livingston, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 & EEOC Enforcement, 23
STETSON L. REv. 53, 93 (1993) (downplaying the importance of legislative history regarding
arbitration written before Gilmer).
122. Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59 ALB.
L. REv. 905, 921 (1996).
123. S. 2012, 103d Cong. (1994).
124. H.R. 4981, 103d Cong. (1994); S. 2405, 103d Cong. (1994).
125. See Van Engen, supra note 107, at 410-11 (discussing congressional proposals to
limit mandatory arbitration).
126. See White, supra note 52, at 101 (analyzing the EEOC's role and the deference
afforded to the Commission in comparison to other executive agencies).
127. The EEOC faced a backlog of 110,000 claims in 1995, and funding has been
sharply reduced since then. See Peter Eisler, Waiting for Justice: Complainants Now Sit for
at Least a Year, USA TODAY, Aug. 15, 1995, at Al. However, by mid-1998, the
Commission reduced its backlog to 58,000. However, the Commission admits that the
twelve month lapse for a single claim to funnel through the system is still wholly
unacceptable. See Watkins Ludlam Winter & Stennis, P.A., Are Reforms Ahead for the
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strict opposition to mandatory arbitration, the EEOC could provide
arbitrators with the necessary and appropriate statutory interpretations and
guidelines to ensure fairness and neutrality according to the standards
established by the EEOC. 12' For example, the Commission could establish
guidelines and instructions for awards through a mandatory arbitration
system. Any award inconsistent with the Commission's guidelines could
be presumptively improper, and, thus, readily set aside by a reviewing
court. 129  Additionally, the EEOC litigates only .5% of the claims
received,13 ° resulting in 99.5% of the claimants being denied recourse from
the agency that was created to give employees a voice. Thus, the EEOC's
pronouncement that mandatory arbitration agreements dangerously usurp
the role of the federal government seriously fails to consider the significant
input and influence the Commission itself could have on mandatory
arbitration agreements, and therefore, the potential usefulness of such
systems, if given proper guidance, to the furtherance of the EEOC's
ultimate goals.' 3
C.' The EEOC's Arguments Regarding the Inherent Limitations of a
Mandatory Arbitration System Are Unsubstantiated and Premised on
an Unfair View of Employers and Arbitrators
The EEOC's final argument against mandatory arbitration agreements
is that any mandatory system offers limited benefits to employees because
of bias in favor of employers in the arbitration system. The EEOC cites the
employer's role as a "repeat customer" and a ready source of funds and
power as significant sources of this bias. 3 2 Additionally, the EEOC's
policy reveals a certain mistrust of arbitrators as well. However, instead of
focusing on improving the arbitration selection process or implementing
requirements for a fair mandatory program, the EEOC instead confines its
efforts to its unsubstantiated, unfair, and misguided opposition to
mandatory arbitration agreements.
The presumption that employers can and will manipulate the
mandatory arbitration system relies on an overly broad negative stereotype
EEOC?, 2 Miss. EMP. L. 1 (1998).
128. See White, supra note 52, at 101-02.
129. See id. at 102 (discussing role of EEOC in arbitration).
130. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EEOC's EXPANDING WORKLOAD:
INCREASES IN AGE DISCRIMINATION AND OTHER CHARGES CALL FOR NEW APPROACH,
GAO/HEHS 94-32 (Feb. 9, 1994).
131. The EEOC stresses the need for voluntary compliance by employers. The use of
mandatory arbitration agreements reinforced by guidance and evaluation by the Commission
can help achieve this goal better than forbidding employers to take advantage of a system
that the EEOC itself uses.
132. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64.
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of employers. Employers are as diverse as their workforces. For example,
in a General Accounting Office ("GAO") survey 133 of twenty-six
mandatory policies established before the EEOC's current policy, the
procedures utilized varied greatly, indicating that employers do not
necessarily use pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the same way or for
the same reasons. 34 Of the twenty-six employers surveyed, only one had
unilateral designation of an arbitrator by the employer, and only one
employer refused attorney participation (albeit for either side).135 However,
twenty-one employers clearly permitted claimants to be represented by
attorneys. Additionally, four employees covered the entire cost of the
arbitration proceedings while six others capped the employee's share. 36 As
commentators opposed to mandatory arbitration agreements have noted,
"most employers have not been [anti-employee] ... indeed some have been
quite benign.', 137 Additionally, a significant majority of companies are not
even willing to impose mandatory arbitration in their employment
contracts. 138  Therefore, by justifying the policy against mandatory
133. See U.S. GENERAL AcCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 130.
134. Consider Brown & Root, a Houston-based construction company which requires all
30,000 of its domestic employees to settle claims exclusively through its arbitration system.
The system consists of four levels of dispute resolution, where the final step is outside
arbitration. The company offers to pay all of the arbitrator's fees and up to $2,500 in
attorneys' fees for a claimant-employee. See Lewton, supra note 5, at 993-94. Only four
out of 500 claims have ever had to go to outside binding arbitration (the final level), and
fewer than 35 employees have used the outside counsel fund. See William T. D'Zurilla,
ADR: The Brown & Root Success Story, 42 LA. Bus. J. 581,581 (1995).
Also consider the peer review adjudication program maintained by Employment
Dispute Resolution, Inc. This company operates as a contract company with employees and
employers to provide binding arbitration of all workplace disputes. The program comes
with a defense fund shared by participating employers and involves training of employees
who eventually become adjudicators available for other companies. See Wade Lambert,
Employee Pacts to Arbitrate Sought by Firms, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1992, at BI. But see
Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management of Colo., 163 F.3d 1230, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999)
(denying employer's motion to compel arbitration of employee's Title VII, ADA, and
section 1981 claims because the employee was required to pay one half of the arbitrator's
fees which, according to the appellate court, "substantially limited [the employee's] use of
the arbitral forum").
135. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 130.
136. See id. Employers capped employee shares of arbitration costs at $250, two days'
pay, or a fraction of the cost-typically 20%.
137. Grodin, supra note 77, at 21 (opposing mandatory arbitration agreements regardless
of the neutrality of the system).
138. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST
PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DIsPUTE RESOLUTION (Pub. No.
GAO/HEHS-95-150, July 5, 1995) available at <http:lfwebgate.access.gpo.gov/
cg... txt&directory=fdiskb/wais/datalgao> (Report to Congressional Requesters) (reporting
that ten percent of firms used arbitration for non-union employees, yet in only one-fourth to
one-half of those firms was arbitration mandatory). Additionally, the National Association
of Securities Dealers ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange eliminated from its U-4
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arbitration agreements on the unsubstantiated generalizations that
employers will insert mandatory arbitration agreements en masse, and
purposefully manipulate arbitration proceedings and agreements, the EEOC
is unnecessarily excluding every private employer, regardless of good faith
or intention, from establishing a useful role in the implementation and
furtherance of employment law principles.
Perhaps the EEOC fears that employers will use mandatory pre-
dispute arbitration agreements as modem-day "yellow dog" contracts.
1 39
These contracts provided that the mere attempt by employees to organize,
regardless of the level of peace, fairness, or success, could render
organizers liable for tortious inducement of breach of contract. However,
this analogy is inaccurate. "Yellow dog" contracts served no reciprocal
function for the employers; they merely forbade unionization. By contrast,
arbitration offers certain advantages to both employers and employees, as
the EEOC itself recognizes. Furthermore, unlike the contracts in which
workers were denied their statutory right to organize, mandatory arbitration
agreements do not deny employees recourse.
The EEOC also bases its policy on the tacit assumption that juries are
naturally biased in favor of employees and that arbitrators are biased in
favor of employers.140  However, neither the EEOC nor other strict
opponents of pre-dispute arbitration clauses can cite reliable studies
comparing the results of arbitration and litigation for cases arising out of
the employmaent relationship.4  In fact, in one empirical study of nearly
1,000 employment cases decided by juries in federal and state courts in
California from 1981 to 1995, employee-plaintiffs won one or more of their
claims in 57.6% of the cases. 142 In comparison, a study of the securities
registration forms (the form at issue in Gilmer) any requirement that the dealers must agree
to arbitrate their statutory employment claims. Instead, arbitration is permitted only where
both parties have agreed to arbitration after the claim has arisen. See Arbitration: New York
Stock Exchange Moves to End Mandatory Arbitration of Bias Claims, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 173, at A-2 (Sept. 8, 1998).
139. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment
Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017 (1996); Judith P.
Vladeck, Validity of ADR for Job Disputes; "Yellow Dog" Contracts Revisited, N.Y. L.J.,
July 24, 1995, at 7.
140. See EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 64. Employers
have an advantage as repeat customers, the policy states, whereas employees benefit from
the public scrutiny/accountability of the courtroom. Yet, many employers actually view
arbitrators as pro-employee. See Loren K. Allison & Eric H.J. Stahlhut, Arbitration and the
ADA: Do the Two Make Strange Bedfellows?, 37 REs GESTAE 163, 172 (1993). For
example, the relaxed evidence rules of arbitration allow arbitrators to hear and consider
theories, arguments, and testimony that otherwise would not have been permitted. See Peter
Blackman, Defending Arbitration: Supporters Surface Among the Employment Bar, N.Y.
L.J., July 14, 1994, at 5 (highlighting differences between arbitrators and judges).
141. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 64 (calling the lack of studies "unfortunate").
142. See id. (citing a 1995 study by Orrick, Herrington, & Sutcliffe of 949 actual jury
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industry, which until recently required mandatory arbitration agreements as
a condition of registration and brokerage accounts, found that employees
won damages in 53.2% of their claims.143 Opponents of mandatory
agreements also cite the dramatic difference-$575,000-between the
mean monetary awards from juries and those from arbitrators.'
44
Nonetheless, this comparison is relatively useless, for a comparison of
mean damage awards fails to consider the expenses embodied in the
relative proceedings. For example, such comparisons must take into
account the frequency and amount of attorneys fee awards in trials, which
presumably last significantly longer than an arbitration proceeding. Also
relevant is the amount of the award that covers back pay. An arbitration
proceeding can be completed within six to nine months after the incident
occurred, 145 whereas an employee can be litigating a claim for nearly five
years146 in the civil system.
Furthermore, some evidence exists to indicate that litigation results do
not significantly differ from arbitration results. According to a
Philadelphia study of civil arbitration programs, arbitration award patterns
were virtually identical for judge and jury awards on issues of both liability
and damage assessment. 47 Other commentators have similarly concluded
that arbitrators and judges are likely to decide the same way. 4' Given the
absence of reliable statistics showing that mandatory employment
arbitration decisions consistently favor employers and the existence of
evidence indicating a lack of any difference between litigation and
arbitration results, the EEOC appears to be relying on imperfect
information as a primary justification for its policy of completely
prohibiting mandatory arbitration agreements.
Finally, the general mistrust of the arbitration system evidenced in the
EEOC policy should be criticized as misguided and unsubstantiated. In
fact, the Gilmer Court explicitly denounced such broad, general attacks on
the adequacy of arbitration procedures as contrary to the Court's
verdicts in employment-related cases).
143. See Stuart H. Bompey & Andrea H. Stempel, Four Years Later: A Look at
Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims After Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 21 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 21, 30-47 (1995) (summarizing a
study of sixty-two securities industry arbitration proceedings).
144. See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 65. Mean verdict award is $703,600 compared to
$124,500 for arbitration awards.
145. See Mathiason, supra note 91, at 30.
146. See Skrainka, supra note 89, at 989.
147. See Pearson, supra note 75. Of 296 cases ending in a verdict, 71% resulted in
verdicts for plaintiffs, compared to 80% in arbitration.
148. See Mark Berger, Can Employment Law Arbitration Work?, 61 UMKC L. REV.
693, 714 (1993) (asserting that studies show judges and arbitrators are likely to decide the
same way); Blackman, supra note 140, at 3 (quoting a plaintiff's attorney who sees no
dramatic difference in a claimant's likelihood of success between arbitration and the courts).
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endorsement of the method.' 49 The Court noted that the argument that
arbitration panels would be naturally biased is mere speculation. 50
Therefore, while the EEOC clearly should suggest ways to choose and
implement a fair mandatory arbitration proceeding, the "biased arbitration
system" argument is no longer sufficient to justify an outright policy
against mandatory agreements to arbitrate. In fact, although at the
"eleventh hour"' 51  the Dunlop Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations eschewed a recommendation in favor of
outright enforcement of pre-dispute agreements satisfying certain quality
standards, the Commission hailed many of the safeguards essential to the
unbiased and effective operation of any pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreement.
The American Bar Association, other private organizations which
provide alternative dispute resolution services, plaintiffs' bars, and union
representatives all recognize the importance of promoting the fairness and
neutrality of arbitrators. These institutions formed the Due Process
Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out
of the Employment Relationship, which recommends specific procedural
safeguards for arbitration, mandatory and otherwise.1 52 While this protocol
is not law, it refutes the view that arbitrators are inherently biased in favor
of employers. 53 Additionally, the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") issued new rules for the resolution of employment disputes in
June of 1996. The policy of this national organization is to "administer
dispute resolution programs which meet the due process standards as
outlined in these rules and the Due Process Protocol. This includes pre-
dispute, mandatory arbitration programs, as a condition of employment.
1 54
Similarly, JAMS/Endispute will serve under mandatory arbitration
agreements so long as a "minimum set of procedures or standards of
procedural fairness" are present.1 55 At the very least, the Protocol and other
policies aimed at ensuring employee rights within the mandatory arbitration
149. See 500 U.S. at 34.
150. See id.
151. Estreicher, supra note 85, at 1348.
152. See Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Employment
Disputes, 142 INDwmuAL EMp. RTs. MANUAL 534:401 (1996). This group could not reach
a consensus on whether pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims
could be required as a condition of employment and, therefore, did not ban them entirely.
153. In fact, some private arbitrators refused to service mandatory arbitration agreements
even before the EEOC's July 1997 policy statement. See National Academy ofArbitrators'
Statement and Guidelines Adopted May 21, 1997, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 103, at E-1
(May 29, 1997).
154. American Arbitration Association, National Rules for the Resolution of Employment
Disputes (visited Feb. 23, 1999) <http:/www.adr.org/rules/ employment_rules.html>.
155. J.A.M.S.Endispute Arbitration Rules, 142 INDIVIDUAL EMP. RTs. MANUAL 534:521
(1996).
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setting should indicate to the EEOC that an alternative to an
overly-prohibitive policy exists.
IV. CONCLUSION
The EEOC's policy against pre-dispute mandatory arbitration
agreements is unwarranted and misguided. The primary justifications for
this policy are either unsubstantiated or have been rejected consistently by
the Supreme Court. Since the issuance of this policy statement, EEOC
field workers must devote more of their already limited resources to fight
these agreements, while employees continue to wait for their claims to be
addressed.
Instead, the EEOC should offer guidelines with respect to mandatory
arbitration agreements in the employment arena, as the potential for abuse
may exist. Given the obvious benefits of a fair mandatory arbitration
system, the EEOC should focus its efforts on ways to ensure and promote
neutrality and efficiency via mandatory arbitration should an employer
choose that method. Numerous commentators, whether strictly opposed to
mandatory arbitration agreements or simply cautious of their potential for
abuse, suggest relatively simple protections that can help ensure fairness to
the individual employee, yet permit an employer to tailor an agreement as
she desires. 56 In fact, the most essential safeguards to a mandatory system
should mimic those suggested by the Dunlop Commission with respect to
any private arbitration scheme, including: no restriction on the right to file
with proper administrative agencies, a competent arbitrator, a fair and
simple discovery, a right to representation, a range of remedies, and a
written award explaining the arbitrator's rationale.1
57
The EEOC must become cognizant of its own resource limitations and
recognize that, with the proper guidance, mandatory arbitration agreements
can supplement the EEOC's quest to achieve the fundamental goals and
principles of employment law. Private arbitration should never, and will
never, replace the EEOC or judicial resolution of statutory employment
claims. However, private arbitration, even if mandatory, can complement
enforcement goals and satisfy individual and public objectives with respect
to employment arbitration.
156. The most common suggestions to ensure fairness are: (1) clear identification and
notification to employees regarding the fights being waived and the disputes covered by the
agreement; (2) education of employees about the arbitration process and the provision of
explanatory materials; (3) avoidance of limitations on substantive rights; and (4) use of
qualified, diverse arbitration panels. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of
Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to Designing and Implementing Enforceable
Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REv. 591, 605-18 (1995); Ponte, supra note 104, at 384-86.
157. See U.S. Dept's of Commerce and Labor, Commission on the Future of
Worker-Management Relations, Report and Recommendations 31 (1994).
